Introduction
In an earlier paper I presented the following argument to the conclusion that time travellers cannot change the past: 1 It is widely believed that if backward time travel were possible, one could go back in time and, with the benefit of foresight, prevent one's past mistakes and the terrible events of history. One could kill Adolf Hitler when he was young, urge Ned Kelly to cover his knees, and so on. Sadly, this idea is incoherent-I call it the second-time-around fallacy. There can be no first time around of a set of events, with the time traveller absent, followed by a second time around of the very same events, with the time traveller playing a role: for either there is no second time around; or else the second time around is a genuinely distinct series of events, to be involved in which is to avoid rather than change the original series of events. To see this, consider that to say that an event (for example, Australia losing the America's Cup in 1987) both did and did not occur, simpliciter, is to assert a contradiction. To be able to say without contradiction that some event both did and did not occur, one must posit at least two times or places such that the event occurred at one, but not at the other. Suppose that times are multi- The present paper proceeds as follows. In §2 I discuss Goddu's reconstruction of the Avoidance argument, point out some problems with that reconstruction, and clarify the position that the Avoidance argument is intended to 2 Smith (1997) p.365-366. 3 As we shall see in §2, Goddu uses the term 'Avoidance Argument' to refer to a somewhat different argument. Except when quoting Goddu, I shall always use the term 'Avoidance argument' to refer to the argument in Smith (1997) p.365-366 quoted above.
4 GODDU, G.C. -"Time travel and changing the past (or how to kill yourself and live to tell the tale)". Ratio. Vol. 16 (2003) p.16-32. 5 GODDU, G.C. -"Avoiding or changing the past?". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 92 (2011) p.11-17. support. In §3 I discuss what would be required to substantiate the claim that a given model involves changing rather than avoiding the past. In §4 I consider Goddu's hypertime model and an earlier model due to Meiland (1974). 6 Both Meiland and Goddu claim that their models allow for time travellers to change the past. I show that while both models are coherent, neither author does what would be required to substantiate the claim that the model involves changing (not avoiding) the past. In §5 I go on to give reasons for the stronger claim that no-one can present a coherent model and also substantiate the claim that it involves changing (not avoiding) the past-and hence the conclusion of the Avoidance argument stands. As it stands, the avoidance argument is not specifically about changing the past. Rather it is about the possibility of changing events simpliciter. Regardless, if no events can be changed, then no past events can be changed and the past cannot be changed. For ease of expression, I shall continue to use the Avoidance Argument that applies to all events. Those who see a significant difference between past events and present or future events should just read 'event E' in the Avoidance Argument as 'past event E'. 7 6 MEILAND, Jack W. -"A two-dimensional passage model of time for time travel". Philosophical Studies. Vol. 26 (1974) p.153-173. 7 Goddu (2011) p.12.
I do not endorse this argument-and the problem does not turn on the consideration of all events as opposed to just past events. Intuitively events can change (and they can be changed by the actions of individuals). For example, a sporting event might change from being one sided to being a nail biter-or a meeting might change from antagonistic and unconstructive to positive and fruitful (perhaps as a result of someone's giving a compelling speech). Such changes involve an event that is spread across time changing from being one way at some earlier time to another way at some later time. (The sporting event is one sided in the first half and a nail biter at the end; the meeting is initially antagonistic and unconstructive but later becomes positive and fruitful.) I have no objection to this ordinary conception of an event changing over time (while remaining the same event).
My argument is against the idea that an event might change from being one way at a certain time t to being another way at that same time t-or to put it another way, against the idea that it is possible for things to change so that instead of E happening (or not happening) at some time t, E does not happen traveller informs her younger self at age eighteen of something she did not know when she was eighteen but wishes she had known-say, the dangers of smoking).
Given that I do not endorse Goddu's argument, coming up with a counterexample to that argument-say, the example of the meeting, which changes over time while remaining the same meeting-is not enough to answer my original Avoidance argument. However this point need not detain us, because the hypertime model that Goddu proposes would-if successful-show that my original argument was mistaken. That is, the model would involve an event changing from being one way at some time t to being a different way at that very same time t. So let us move on.
Two Tasks
What Goddu-and Meiland before him-attempt to do is provide a coherent model of changing the past: a model in which an event changes from being one way at a time t to being a different way at the same time t-or in which a time t changes from being such that some event occurs at t to being such that the event does not occur at t (or vice versa). Both authors accept that in order to be coherent, such models must involve a bifurcation: there must be two versions of the time t, or else we simply have a contradiction when we say that t both is and is not such that some event E occurs at t. To see this, forget about hypertime for a moment and compare the situation with (normal) change (of normal everyday objects) over (normal) time.
In a nutshell, the problem of change is as follows. Suppose an object changes from being P to being not P (or vice versa). So we have an object that is P and an object that is not P. Now if they are the very same object then this is a contradiction: we are saying that the object is both P and not P. But if they are different objects then we do not have change: instead of one object changing from possessing P to lacking P we just have two different objects, one of which possesses P and one of which lacks P. Now if we posit time 8 Goddu uses this term. Meiland speaks of two time dimensions but does not use the term 'hypertime' for one of them. Nevertheless I shall sometimes, for the sake of convenience, use the term 'hypertime' when discussing Meiland's view (but never in such a way that my argument turns on the use of this particular term).
we potentially open the way to a solution to this problem: but we do not, simply by positing time, solve the problem. With time in the picture we open the way to saying that while there is a contradiction in an object possessing P and not possessing P (simpliciter), there is no contradiction in an object possessing P at time t 1 and not possessing P at another time t 2 . However, this is just the beginning of a solution to the problem of change. We still need a substantive account of how the very same object can persist from t 1 to t 2 while possessing different properties at (or relative to) these two times. Many different substantive accounts have been proposed. For a taste of some positions in the area-without any pretence at a comprehensive survey-consider the following views.
Three-dimensionalism is the view that persons, tables and other material objects are three-dimensional entities. On this view, what you see in the mirror is a whole person. 9 Tomorrow, when you look again, you will see the whole person again. On this view, persons and other temporal objects are wholly present at every time at which they exist. Four-dimensionalism is the view that persons, tables and other material objects are four-dimensional entities, extending through three dimensions of space and one dimension of time. On this view, what you see in the mirror is not a whole person: it is just a threedimensional temporal part of a person. Tomorrow, when you look again, you will see a different such temporal part. Say that an object persists through time if it is around at some time and still around at a later time. Three-and fourdimensionalists agree that (some) objects persist, but they differ over how objects persist. According to three-dimensionalists, objects persist by enduring:
an object persists from t 1 to t 2 by being wholly present at t 1 and t 2 and every instant in between. According to four-dimensionalists, objects persist by perduring: an object persists from t 1 to t 2 by having temporal parts at t 1 and t 2 and every instant in between. Perduring can be usefully compared with being extended in space: a road extends from Melbourne to Sydney not by being wholly located at every point in between but by having a spatial part at every point in between.
Leibniz's Law says that if x = y (i.e. x and y are identical-one and the same entity) then x and y have exactly the same properties. There is a superficial conflict between this principle of logic and the fact that things change. If
Bill is at one time thin and at another time not so-and yet it is the very same person both times-it looks as though the very same entity (Bill) both possesses and fails to possess the property of being thin. Three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists respond to this problem in different ways. According to the four-dimensionalist, what is thin is not Bill (who is a four-dimensional entity) but certain temporal parts of Bill; and what is not thin are other temporal parts of Bill. So there is no single entity that both possesses and fails to possess the property of being thin. Three-dimensionalists have several options. One is to deny that there are such properties as 'thin' (simpliciter): there are only temporally relativised properties such as 'thin at time t'. In that case, while Bill at t 1 and Bill at t 2 are the very same entity-Bill is wholly present at each time-there is no single property that this one entity both possesses and fails to possess: Bill possesses the property 'thin at t 1 ' and lacks the property 'thin at t 2 '. 10 On any view in this area, the question of diachronic identity conditions-the question whether and why some object at t 2 is or is not the same object as some object at t 1 -is a substantive one. 11 For example, suppose that at t 1 there are two books on the shelf: one red and one dark blue. At t 2 there are two books on the shelf: one orange and one light blue. Is the red book at t 1 the same book as the orange book at t 2 , or the light blue book, or neither? We cannot just claim whatever we like here: the answer depends on the causal relations between the various objects. If the red book just sat there and was faded by the sun until it became orange, then we will want to say that the red book is the same as the orange book; if the red book was removed, re-bound in light blue cloth and then returned to the shelf, then we will want to say that it is the same book as the light blue one; and so on. There are notorious puzzle cases in this area-the Ship of Theseus; puzzles of personal identity involving teletransportation, fission or fusion; and so on-that make the task of giving diachronic identity conditions for particular kinds of objects very difficult.
Returning to the case of hypertime and changing the past, the lesson is as follows. To give a coherent model of changing the past, positing hypertime is not enough. Two further tasks must also be completed. Task One is to give the general format of the account: we need to specify in what kind of way a normal time is supposed to persist across hypertime. For example, does this happen in something like a perdurantist or an endurantist way? Meiland seems to have in mind some sort of endurantist picture: he notes that when he says that different times have different pasts associated with them, he means pasts that are numerically the same but qualitatively different. 12 Goddu seems to have in mind a perdurantist picture: he talks of objects, events and moments of time being hypertemporally extended and having hypertemporal parts. 13 Neither author gives a fully explicit discussion of this issue-but let us move on: the real problem is the next task.
Task Two is to flesh out the general format with substantive content. Specifically, we need to give substantive content to the claim that some normal time t 1 at hypertime a and some normal time t 2 at hypertime b are or are not (hypertemporal parts of) the same normal time. It is not good enough simply to claim that t 1 at hypertime a is (or is not) the same time as t 2 at hypertime b: we need some substantive account of what would make it the case that t 1 at hypertime a is (or is not) the same time as t 2 at hypertime b. We need a substantive answer to the question as to what the difference is between a case where t 1 at hypertime a is the same time as t 2 at hypertime b, and a case where t 3 at hypertime c is not the same time as t 4 at hypertime d. That is, we need some account of the diahyperchronic identity conditions of (normal) times (and similarly of the events that occur at these times). (Recall: in the ordinary case of persistence over time, we cannot just claim that book B at time t 2 is the same as book A at time t 1 and book C at time t 3 is not the same as book A at time t 1 : we need a substantive account of what would make such claims true. We do not solve the problem of how a book can change from being red to orange just by positing times-we also need a substantive account of the diachronic identity conditions for books.) It is here that Meiland and Goddu fall downas we shall see in §4. In §5 I shall furthermore argue that it is hard to see how anyone could complete Task Two.
12 Meiland (1974) p.160. 13 Goddu (2011) p.17, n.8.
Meiland and Goddu on Task Two
Meiland introduces his hypertime model via a diagram: 14 He then writes:
Here we have a multi-dimensional theory of time-in particular, a two-dimensional theory-as compared with the usual one-dimensional theory which represents time along a straight line. The moments labelled t 1 to t 7 on the diagonal line are present moments.
The line P 1 -t 1 (which we can call 'P 1 ' for short) represents the past when t 1 is the present moment. That is, P 1 is the past at (or with respect to) the present moment t 1 . Similarly, P 2 is the past with respect to t 2 . The dotted vertical lines indicate the positions of moments in the past. For example, the intersection of P 3 with vertical line Pt 1 is the position of the moment t 1 in the past with respect to t 3 . In this example, t 3 is the present moment and the intersection of the two lines just mentioned is the position of t 1 when t 1 is past with respect to t 3 . 15 Meiland then claims that his model "allows the past to change", 16 Thus, the proposition 'Harrison was not at the Great Exhibition' is true at t 4 and false at t 5 . In other words, our model of time allows propositions about the past to change their truth-value-because it allows the past to change. 17 It is absolutely crucial here that it is the same time t 1 on lines P 4 and P 5 . That is, points A and B must both be time t 1 (in this case 1851) or else Harrison has not changed that time (he has just avoided the past, not changed it). Now consider Task Two. Meiland says nothing at all to substantiate the claim that it is the same time t 1 at points A and B. He simply claims that they are the same time. But what can this mean? We need some substantive account-but we do not get one. We need an account of what would make it the case that two points on his diagram represent the same time and what would make it the case that two points on his diagram represent different times. We need, that is, some account of the diahyperchronic identity conditions of (normal) times.
We get no such account. But without one, we do not have a coherent model of the past changing. We have no reason at all to regard the model as one in which there is a single time 1851 that changes across hypertime, as opposed to one in which there are multiple distinct times variously called '1851' that differ in various ways-in which case Harrison does not change the time that he originally refers to as 1851: he simply avoids it.
Meiland, then, seems not to realise the importance of Task Two. He would appear to be in the same sort of position as someone who thinks that one can solve the problem of change just by positing time-without giving any substantive theory of diachronic identity conditions. Let's now turn to Goddu.
As we shall see, he is more aware of the importance of Task Two-but still fails to complete it in a satisfactory manner. There is a serious problem here. The VCR analogy provides no conceptual basis for understanding a model with two kinds of time because, contrary to first 18 Goddu (2003) p.21-22. appearances, the VCR case does not involve two kinds of time. It is simply a model in which a spatially extended object-a video tape-changes over (normal) time. 'Cassette time' is not a temporal measure at all: it is a measure of distance along the tape. It is simply convenient, in the circumstances, to measure off distance along the tape according to how long it would take to get to a certain position on the tape were the tape played or recorded at normal speed. Just because it uses terminology normally used to measure temporal intervals, this does not make cassette time a temporal measure-no more than 'light year' is a measure of time (it is a measure of spatial distance). The VCR case is just a perfectly mundane case of a spatially extended object changing over time-like a fence (or section thereof) being painted one colour and then later repainted. Now suppose my bus runs to a very regular schedule and travels past this fence. I may therefore decide to label sections of the fence using terms normally used to refer to times: the 8:00:00 to 8:00:30 section, and so on. Even so, this still doesn't make the fence repainting scenario a model of time changing over time-when I say that 8:00:00 to 8:00:30 changes, I just mean that a certain spatial part of the fence changes-and the VCR model is no better than the fence model as a conceptual basis for understanding how times could change over time.
In his 2011 paper, Goddu directly addresses the worry that his model, by bifurcating times, involves avoiding not changing the past. However, as we shall now see, his argument contains a series of unwarranted assumptions and ultimately fails as an attempt at Task Two. Goddu begins:
Suppose events are individuated in terms of the locations and times at which the events take place such that happenings at different locations or different times are distinct events. Surely some such assumption is underpinning Smith's claims. . . concerning bifurcation of time or place resulting in a 'genuinely distinct series of events '. 19 After writing here of events being individuated by locations and times, Goddu immediately goes on to talk of "the times that individuate events". 20 In any case, I do not assume that events are individuated by times, or by times and locations-and indeed I think this view is pretty clearly false. Events can be moved and postponed without becoming different events-and two distinct events can occur at the same place and time.
19 Goddu (2011) p.13. 20 Goddu (2011) Moving on, Goddu presents the VCR example again-and then writes: 21 No portion of the tape occurs at more than one period of elapsedtape-time, so there is no bifurcation of the times that individuate different portions of the tape. Different portions of the tape exist, can be played, and have different properties at multiple clocktimes, so there is some bifurcation of the time of a given portion of the tape. Hence, not all bifurcations of time need be bifurcations that individuate. As a result, we can describe portions of the tape changing without contradiction because the different times at which the particular portion of the tape is one way and then another are not themselves elapsed-tape times. 22 The idea here is that portions of the tape are individuated by elapsed tape time-and hence we can have the same portion of tape occurring at different clock times. But as I have already pointed out, 'elapsed tape time' is a measure of spatial distance along the tape-it is not a temporal measure at all. All we have here is an ordinary example of a spatially extended object changing over time. The VCR analogy therefore gives us no basis for understanding how a period of time could change over time-and hence Goddu is quite unwarranted to continue as follows:
Now consider a more exotic possibility. Suppose that just as elapsedtape-time is embedded in clock-time, clock-time itself is embedded in some higher order time. For ease of presentation call the time in which clock-or normal-time is embedded, 'hypertime'. So just as the period of the tape from 0.05.00 through 0.15.00 could be played at different clock-times, so could different periods of normal-time and the events of those times occur at different hypertimes. The result would be that, just as objects can exist at more than one time and so be one way at one time and another way at some other, moments of time or the events of moments of time can also exist at more than one hypertime. 23 There is no "just as" here-because (as already remarked) the VCR example involves a spatially located (or extended) point (or section) of tape changing 21 Note that the term 'elapsed-tape-time' is now used in place of the earlier term 'cassettetime '. 22 Goddu (2011) p.13-14. 23 Goddu (2011) p.14.
over time-whereas the hypertime case is supposed to involve a temporally located (or extended) point (or interval) changing over a second temporal dimension.
Goddu now makes another unargued assumption: "Assuming that events are individuated by the normal-times at which they occur". 24 Here there is an even more crucial-and entirely unargued-assumption. The assumption is that "1928" at hypertime a and "1928" at hypertime b really are one and the same normal time. Even if we accept the earlier assumption that events are individuated by normal times, we cannot conclude that Jack changes (rather than avoids) the events of 1928 unless we know that the at hypertime b is the same time as "1928" at hypertime a is the VCR analogy.
As I have shown, this analogy fails. Hence Goddu does not carry out Task
Two. Ultimately he gives us no more reason than Meiland does to think that we have a model in which there is a single past that changes-as opposed to multiple pasts, one of which is avoided in favour of another.
24 Goddu (2011) p.14. 25 Goddu (2011) p.15.
Reasons to Think Task Two Insurmountable
The project shared by Meiland and Goddu is to make sense of the idea that the past could change, by giving a model in which there are two temporal dimensions: normal time and hypertime. In order to make good on this project, one must give substantive content to the idea that the same normal time occurs at multiple different hypertimes. Task One was to specify whether 'same' here is to be understood in a perdurantist kind of way or an endurantist kind of way (or perhaps some other kind of way). Task Two is to specify what kinds of relations are required between normal time t 1 at hypertime a and normal time t 2 at hypertime b in order for it to be the case that t 1 and t 2 are, or are not, the same time. We need a substantive account of what would make it the case that they are, or are not, the same normal times. It is not good enough simply to present a certain scenario and just claim that "1928" (or "1851" or whatever) at hypertime a and "1928" at hypertime b are the same normal time. We need an account of the conditions under which such a claim would be true and the conditions under which it would be false. Just as in the ordinary case of change we need diachronic identity conditions for spatially extended objects, here we need diahyperchronic identity conditions for normal time instants and periods of normal time and for the events located at these normal times.
Here there is a serious obstacle. Consider identity of objects over normal time (with no hypertime in the picture). The reason we want to say that book B at time t 2 is the same as book A at time t 1 and book C at time t 3 is not the same as book A at time t 1 is that how book B is depends in a particular kind of way on how book A was and how book C is does not. Presumably, then, in the hypertime case, the basis for claiming that normal time t 1 at hypertime a and normal time t 2 at hypertime b are the same time is that how t 2 is at hypertime b depends in a particular kind of way on how t 1 is at hypertime a. how t 1 is at hypertime b. The latter requires thinking: how t 1 is at hypertime b depends on how t 1 is at hypertime a and how t 1 is at hypertime a suffices for how t 1 is at hypertime b. These claims of causal dependence and sufficiency cannot all be true. 
